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Abstract   
This paper aims to provide conceptual clarity on wicked problems, or those planning and 
policy problems that cannot be solved but only reinterpreted. It does so by using participatory 
water governance as reference, and paradox and institutional bricolage as theorizing methods. 
The idea that wicked problems are intractable and complex but ultimately solvable is a 
paradoxical proposition implicit in much literature. Recognising the function of the different 
orders of governance helps distinguish between wicked and non-wicked or tame problems. 
The intractability of wicked problems originates from the order of meta-governance where 
paradigms compete for the definition of the grand principles of governance, whereas tame 
problems can be solved in second-order governance or the domain of policy implementation. 
Post-wickedness demands attention for the dual relationship of wicked and tame planning 
and policy problems, as each influences the interpretation of the other. In fact, their 
interdependence is crucial to promoting social justice. 
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1. Introduction   
In their seminal work, Rittel and Webber (1973) describe planning and policy problems as 
wicked or intractable problems that cannot be solved but only reinterpreted. The intractability 
of wicked problems is due to the fact that goal formulation is a political process dependent on 
social values. Achieving societal consensus on the paradigms that inform planning and 
policy, and on the ultimate goals of policy, is therefore impossible. At most, agreement 
around problem definition and successful policy implementation can be obtained for tame 
problems, whose solution depends on defining measurable indicators of success (Coyne, 
2005; Weber and Khademian, 2008). For example, the debate around whether water services 
should be operated by the public or private sector is a typical wicked problem and has not 
been solved since the question emerged in the late XIX century (Hall et al., 2013). 
Conversely, achieving the MDG target to halve by 2015 the proportion of the world 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation is a tame 
problem. In fact, it is possible to reach consensus on the desirability of solving this policy 
problem. It is also possible to structure and solve this problem by achieving the MDG target 
as defined by the United Nations.       
 
The fact that wicked problems cannot be solved means that wickedness is a necessary 
condition of planning and policy. Another characteristic of wicked problems is problem 
complexity, which is due to the contingency that affects the causes of social problems. In 
other words, the interconnectedness of the causes of planning and policy problems entails the 
complexity of solving these problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The intractability of wicked 
problems therefore lies in the indeterminacy of diagnosis and inadequacy of prognosis. The 
notions of the necessity of wickedness and problem complexity support the exploration of the 
way in which planning and policy problems are interpreted and addressed. More precisely, 
they provide lenses through which to view the definition and structuring of such problems 
across communities of practice and through time. Also, the analytical categories of the 
necessity of wickedness and problem complexity enable the investigation of decision making 
on the adoption of alternative solutions to tame problems and on the relative efficiency and 
effectiveness of these solutions. Here it is important to note that in a complex world, 
contingent relationships do not only apply to the causes of problems but can also apply to 
problems. Wicked and tame problems arising in a given governance sub-system can therefore 
be interdependent. If wickedness presupposes the normative and cognitive institutions that 
enable and constrain the prognosis and diagnosis of tame problems, problem complexity 
limits the rationality of decisions and efficacy of solutions.  
 
Consisting in the contribution of individual citizens and civil society to the exercise of 
democratic government, public participation is part and parcel of policy and governance. It 
does in fact overlap with the horizontal, participatory networks that epitomise governance as 
government beyond the state (Swyngedouw, 2005). Indeed, in the mainstream view of water 
governance promoted by the World Bank, the Global Water Partnership and like-minded 
organisations, participatory governance is good water governance (Rogers and Hall, 2003). 
As such, public participation is a wicked problem. At the same time, it overlaps with the 
multi-actor collaborative networks that are invoked as the solution to wicked problems 
(Weber and Khademian, 2008). The realisation that participatory governance is a wicked 
problem confronts us with a challenging question: how can the problem be the solution? It 
also confronts us with a dilemma: if we despair of defining wicked problems, should we try 
to adopt optimal policies or would random policy adoption suffice to solve problems? Similar 
questions and dilemmas are salient for scholars and policy practitioners concerned with water 
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and sanitation services. In fact, these satisfy basic human needs, prevent public health 
hazards (Heller, 2009), and impact on social and environmental justice (Castro, 2007).  
 
This chapter discusses public participation in the water and sanitation sector as a wicked 
problem. It aims to chart the possibilities - both the potential and limitations - of public 
participation as a technique of water governance. Its first objective is to expound the concept 
of the necessity of wickedness, and in so doing to unravel paradoxes generated by Rittel and 
Webber’s (1973) conceptualisation of wicked problems, and to make explicit the epistemic 
and policy implications of the dilemma of wicked participatory governance. The second 
objective is to illustrate the implications of the necessity of wickedness on the way in which 
the complexity of participatory governance is interpreted and addressed by two competing 
meta-theoretical and political-economic paradigms: the mainstream and neoliberal tradition, 
and the heterodox and communitarian tradition. The chapter pursues these objectives by 
using institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2002; Kincheloe, 2001) to establish synergies between 
multiple perspectives and devise a composite framework that recognises the wickedness and 
complexity of participatory water governance. The theoretical approaches deployed for this 
purpose include Polanyi’s (1944) notion of pendulum swings, Foucauldian approaches to 
knowledge, power, and governance (Swyngedouw, 2005), and the advocacy coalition 
framework (Weible et al., 2009).                  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the causes of the necessity of 
wickedness and on its implications for pendulum swings between competing paradigms. 
These implications include the alternate dominance of dialectical paradigms. Section 3 
illustrates that two paradoxes generated by Rittel and Webber’s (1973) conceptualisation of 
wicked problems – the paradox of wickedness and the paradox of tameness - are false, as 
they originate from the inappropriate use of the terms “wicked problem” and “tame 
problem”. It also rejects the dilemma of wickedness as unacceptable from the critical realist 
point of view, and suggests that identifying the type of planning and policy problems that are 
necessarily wicked promises to support socially acceptable solutions to the dilemma. Section 
4 discusses participatory water governance as a wicked problem and sketches the contours of 
the dialectical paradigms that contend for the control over the conceptualisation and practice 
of public participation in the water and sanitation sector. Section 5 explains how the way in 
which competing dialectical paradigms interpret and address complexity informs different 
ideas of and experiences with participatory water governance. Here, I suggest that the 
orthodox or mainstream reduction of complexity is associated with the neoliberal 
understanding of governance as the realm of exclusion. By contrast, heterodox attempts to 
embrace complexity are the complement of the communitarian preference for inclusion as the 
principle governing governance. The chapter ends with concluding remarks in Section 6.        
 
2. The necessity of wickedness   
Rittel and Webber (1973) pronounce that wicked problems display the following 
characteristics (in the authors’ own words): 1) there is no definitive formulation of a wicked 
problem; 2) wicked problems have no stopping rule; 3) solutions to wicked problems are not 
true-or-false, but good-or-bad; 4) there is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem; 5) every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because 
there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly; 6) 
wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential 
solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated 
5 
 
into the plan; 7) every wicked problem is essentially unique; 8) every wicked problem can be 
considered to be a symptom of another problem; 9) the existence of a discrepancy 
representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of 
explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution; 10) the planner has no right to 
be wrong. As defined by Rittel and Webber, wicked problems have been declared to be the 
norm, not the exception (Coyne, 2005). Also, it is recognised that by definition wicked 
problems are not solved (Weber and Khademian, 2008).    
 
If most planning and policy problems cannot be solved due to their wickedness, the paradox 
of wickedness – the impossibility that the problem can be the solution – applies not only to 
participatory water governance but to most governance processes that are proposed as 
solutions to planning and policy problems. In fact, unless we accept randomness as a decision 
making criterion, the problem of operationalising a governance mechanism needs to be 
solved before the mechanism can be used to solve other governance problems. If true, the 
paradox of wickedness would induce despair of ever fruitfully adopting public participation 
to resolve problems of water governance. The necessary wickedness of planning and policy 
problems also generates the dilemma of wickedness: if we despair of defining wicked 
problems, should our strategy for solving planning and policy problems be based on the 
comparative institutional analysis of feasible governance mechanisms, or on random 
intervention? In that sense, it has been noted that without a paradigm or theory it is not 
possible to depart from empirical relativism, or the inability to distinguish between the 
implications of different facts (MacKenzie and House, 1978). Preference for empirical 
relativism as a decision making criterion would amount to endorsing the social and 
environmental injustice which is today associated with water management across the global 
North and South. From a critical realist point of view (Sayer, 1992) and for all those who care 
for a progressive future, this is unacceptable.  
 
The paradox and dilemma of wicked participatory governance are causally intertwined, and 
their joint solution is required to open up socially desirable possibilities for public 
participation in the water and sanitation sector. I set out to do so by identifying the 
fundamental causes of wickedness and investigating the distinction between wicked and tame 
problems, under the assumption that comparing and contrasting the wicked and non-wicked 
will help reveal the nature of wickedness. I proceed by integrating allied perspectives on 
wicked problems and pendulum swings, which are respectively preoccupied with the 
outcome and process of emergent paradigms. On the one hand, accounts of wicked problems 
imply that the absence of a stopping rule for the definition of wicked problems is due to the 
perpetual competition between opposed paradigms. On the other hand, advances in the study 
of pendulum swings suggest that paradigms become dominant as a result of the political 
struggle between advocacy coalitions, that the intrinsic nature of political confrontation 
means that there is historical necessity in the occurrence of pendulum swings between 
paradigms, and that political confrontation is at the same time a struggle of power and a 
struggle of discourse (Hall et al., 2013). Paradigms therefore are dialectical frameworks used 
by competing advocacy coalitions to mobilise discourse (Lobina, 2012b), which in a 
Foucauldian perspective is knowledge turned into and shaped by power (Richardson, 1996).    
             
The necessity of wickedness, or the impossibility of solving wicked problems, is due to the 
fact that the definition of policy problems is dependent upon transcendental and universal 
principles which in pluralist societies are contested. These contested principles – whose 
definition would allow for identifying stopping rules – include sustainability (Soderbäum, 
2011; Connelly, 2007), nature (Ginn and Demeritt, 2008), and participation itself (Day, 
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1997). These concepts are transcendental and universal as they invoke the ability to go 
beyond society’s developmental limitations in a way that benefits all in society. Controlling 
the meaning and use of such transcendental and universal concepts affords power 
(Swyngedouw, 2010), and that explains why competing advocacy coalitions can be expected 
to contest their definition. In a pluralist society where diverse views of the world are 
tolerated, the political and social struggle for the definition of rules and allocation of wealth – 
a power struggle that implies the mobilisation of ideas and resources - will inevitably extend 
to the struggle for the control of discourse in the public sphere.  
 
The alternate dominance of paradigms is accompanied by the reinterpretation of 
transcendental and universal principles. In turn, this leads to recasting policy problems 
through the lens of redefined principles. The policy implications of this process for the 
definition of wicked problems are significant as exemplified by Bakker’s (2003, 2001) 
illustration of the reinterpretation of the notion of equity in the English and Welsh water 
sector since the 1970s’. In this period, governmental policy abandoned ideas of substantive 
equity in pricing water supply and sanitation, which had been inspired by the ‘ability-to-pay’ 
principle. Instead, it embraced notions of procedural equity linked to the ‘benefit principle’ 
and the use of pricing to reflect the costs imposed by individual households on the system. 
This redefinition of the problem of providing affordable and good quality water services 
radically altered the redistribution of resources between affluent and vulnerable households 
and, together with the 1989 privatisation, contributed to a marked increase in water poverty 
(Lobina and Hall, 2008). 
 
Rittel and Webber’s (1973) taxonomy of the distinctive features of wicked problems contains 
both causes of wickedness (e.g. absence of a stopping rule) and manifestations of wickedness 
(e.g. there is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem). I argue 
that all the causal elements of this taxonomy arise from two fundamental causes: the fact that, 
in a pluralist society, diagnosis is indeterminate due to the necessary occurrence of pendulum 
swings between paradigms; and, the fact that prognosis is inadequate to capture problem 
complexity derived from the contingency of social causation. The former comprehends 
elements 1-4 and 9 in Rittel and Webber’s taxonomy of wickedness. The latter explains 
elements 5-8 and 10. However, while contingency is an immanent condition of social action, 
problem complexity can be expected to apply to all problems – wicked and tame problems 
alike – albeit in varying degrees. It follows that only the dependence of goal formulation on 
the alternate dominance of dialectical frameworks is a unique feature of wicked problems. In 
other words, problem complexity cannot in itself illuminate the distinction between wicked 
and tame problems. In addition, paradigm-dependent problem structuring is the fundamental 
causal mechanism of the necessity of wickedness. Hence, problem complexity exacerbates 
the condition of wickedness but does not constitute wickedness.   
 
3. Two false paradoxes and one unacceptable dilemma  
Much literature on public administration and water policy treats wickedness as a synonym of 
problem complexity and is concerned with identifying solutions to wicked problems (Weber 
and Khademian, 2008; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009; Verhagen et al., 2008). This position, 
which can be described as the paradox of tameness, is equal and opposite to that of the 
paradox of wickedness. It is equal because, like the paradox of wickedness, the paradox of 
tameness fails to distinguish between wicked and tame problems. On the one hand, the 
paradox of tameness collapses wicked into tame problems by assuming that both can be 
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solved. On the other hand, the paradox of wickedness equally treats wicked and tame 
problems as it posits that no planning and policy problem can be solved. The paradox of 
tameness is opposite to the paradox of wickedness because the former assumes that wicked 
problems can be solved while the latter rejects this proposition. Also, while the former 
submits that all problems are tame the latter predicts that all problems are wicked. The two 
paradoxes are false because they fail to distinguish between wicked and non-wicked 
problems. I argue that this failure originates from Rittel and Webber’s (1973) inconsistent 
definition of wicked and tame problems, and their failure to distinguish between planning and 
policy problems at different orders of governance.   
 
As noted, Rittel and Webber’s (1973) ambiguous conceptualisation of wicked problems is 
due to the fact that they define wicked problems in function of two incongruous attributes. 
The necessity of wickedness is an attribute unique to wicked problems while problem 
complexity is an attribute that, by virtue of contingency, potentially characterises all 
problems. This ambiguity mirrors the under-conceptualisation of tame problems. Non-wicked 
problems can be expected to encompass all the problems that can be structured and solved, 
but Rittel and Webber’s (1973) notion of tame problems coincides with those problems that 
are simple to solve. This approach neglects the contingent and context-dependent nature of 
complexity, which varies with changes in the knowledge and capability of the problem-solver 
and in the physical and institutional structure that enables and constrains problem solving. In 
fact, it cannot be assumed that the same problem that is easily solved in one case will retain 
the same degree of complexity in another. The fact that Rittel and Webber (1973) define 
wicked problems on the basis of both a necessary and unique attribute (that of wickedness), 
and a contingent and common attribute (that of problem complexity), is heavy with 
consequences. Indeed, the distinction between the wicked and the non-wicked remains 
unclear as the contingent attribute of problem complexity might be shared by tame problems. 
The notion of tame problem itself remains poorly defined due to its relativity. The ambiguous 
conceptualisation of wicked problems combined with the weak conceptualisation of tame 
problems generates two diametrically opposite but equally false caricatures of planning and 
policy problems.                     
 
A concurrent explanation for Rittel and Webber’s (1973) failure to distinguish between 
wicked and non-wicked problems can be found in their failure to distinguish between 
planning and policy problems in different institutional contexts. They are oblivious to the fact 
that the nature of problems varies according to the orders of governance in which problems 
are situated. Meta-governance is the order of governance where the grand principles of 
governmentality are defined, including the political-economic paradigms that guide policy 
and economic practice. First-order governance pertains to the codification and formalisation 
of these principles in policy instruments that translate norms and values into policy 
programmes. Second-order governance refers to the sphere of policy implementation and 
concerns the design and realisation of policy projects (Swyngedouw, 2005). The necessity of 
wickedness thus descends from meta-governance and produces its effects on the other two 
orders of governance. However, problems in the three orders of governance pursue different 
objectives: the objective for meta-governance problems is to find definitive answers to 
transcendental questions on the organisation of society; the objective for first-order 
governance problems is to operationalise the grand principles of meta-governance for the 
organisation of policy; the objective for second-order governance problems is to achieve 
specific and measurable goals identified by first-order governance. Conflating the three 
orders of governance and overlooking the diversity of problems associated with them, as 
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Rittel and Webber (1973) do, is akin to confusing the frame with the picture. As a matter of 
fact, frame and picture remain distinct objects despite their interdependence.              
 
An example that illustrates the falsity of the two paradoxes is represented by the progress 
recently made by the international community towards achieving the MDG target on water. 
This target – to halve by 2015 the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford 
safe drinking water – was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000 in 
a declaration that refers to equity and sustainable development among its overarching values 
and principles (United Nations, 2000). It is estimated that the MDG target on water has been 
met five years before the set deadline, as two billion people gained access to improved water 
sources between 1990 and 2010 (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). Meeting the MDG target on water 
exemplifies a tame problem that can be structured and solved in the context of second-order 
governance, and as such allows us to infer the qualities of tameness. The example shows that 
tameness does not preclude problem complexity. The achievement of the MDG target on 
water has not occurred without difficulties, as reflected by uneven and discontinued progress 
across countries and through time, and by the fact that the twin target of sanitation is not 
expected to be met by 2015 (WHO/UNICEF, 2012; Castro, 2009). The difficulties in meeting 
the MDG target on water and sanitation are related to the dominant paradigm that has 
governed the organisation of water services in the last 40 years (Castro, 2009; Hall and 
Lobina, 2009). Nonetheless, the tame problem of meeting the MDG target and the wicked 
problem of providing water services through the public or private sector, through solidarity or 
the market, remain distinct. The former can be measurably solved while the latter can, in a 
pluralist society, never be definitely unravelled. The upshot is that, however related, wicked 
and tame problems cannot be conflated into a single category because they arise in different 
orders of governance.                
 
The falsity of the paradox of wickedness and the paradox of tameness becomes now apparent. 
Ascertaining the falsity of the two paradoxes permits the rejection of the dilemma of 
wickedness, in so far as the unqualified despair of solving tame problems cannot be justified. 
Otherwise put, the fact that wicked problems cannot be solved by meta-governance does not 
mean that tame problems cannot be solved by second-order governance. Hence, the 
comparative institutional analysis of alternative and feasible governance mechanisms should 
be preferred as a decision making strategy over random intervention because it allows for 
prioritising the alleviation of social and environmental injustice. Recognising the separation 
of wicked and tame problems as well as their interdependence elicits the merits of 
comparatively evaluating participatory mechanisms in light of their dual relationship with 
competing political-economic paradigms. This relationship determines the policy outcomes 
of participatory governance as paradigms inform the idea and practice of participation. 
Conversely, multi-group assessments of the results produced by participatory mechanisms 
reflect in the collective evaluation of dominant paradigms, thus influencing the direction and 
velocity of pendulum swings (Lobina, 2012b). Scholars and policy practitioners alike should 
therefore go beyond the despair induced by the paradox of wickedness and the reductionism 
of the paradox of tameness. Unbundling planning and policy problems into their wicked and 
tame components and investigating how one transposes into the other, holds promise of 
advancing social knowledge and promoting social and environmental justice. The 
combination of this awareness and commitment is what I call post-wickedness. It is an 
intellectual and practical predisposition that is consequential to making clarity on the 
distinction between wickedness and tameness, and leads to curiosity about the articulation of 
the two.       
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4. Participatory governance as a wicked problem 
The conceptual design of participatory governance is a quintessentially wicked problem 
whose solution depends on the operationalisation of transcendental and universal principles. 
Indeed, the idea of citizen participation is intimately connected with that of democracy and 
evokes principles of inclusiveness, representation, empowerment and emancipation. By 
contrast, those who value organisational effectiveness over democratic process cast doubts on 
the possibility and desirability of direct democracy and public participation, and insist that 
neither should be adopted extensively and in radical forms (Day, 1997). The necessary 
wickedness of participation therefore lies in the essence of governance as a contest between 
rival political projects inspired by different and at times irreconcilable values (Castro, 2007). 
However, participatory governance is also a technique of government for the production of 
governance. It follows that competing paradigms of governance presuppose competing ideas 
of participatory governance. Furthermore, understanding the wickedness of participatory 
governance requires identifying the dialectical relationships between competing paradigms of 
governance and participatory governance. A critical realist and Foucauldian approach 
suggests that paradigms emerge from the interdependence of practical and scholarly 
knowledge, as scholars participate in advocacy coalitions and in the exercise of power. Hence 
I turn to the relationships between governance paradigms associated with social practice and 
theory creation, or meta-theoretical frameworks.   
 
It is possible to identify three paradigms of water governance in function of the principles 
that inspire water service management. The neoliberal or privatist paradigm rests on the 
centrality of the market and thus advocates market development to enhance sustainable water 
development. The administrative rationalism paradigm obtains from the marriage of 
bureaucratic administration with positivistic science, and favours the primacy of technocratic 
solutions (Castro, 2009). The communitarian paradigm upholds community development as 
the ultimate goal of water governance, whether this is pursued through state or community 
involvement (Castro, forthcoming, 2014; Bakker, 2008). These paradigms of water 
governance entail different approaches to participatory water governance, in function of the 
preferred modality of participation. Thus, the neoliberal paradigm is associated with the view 
that participants engage in governance as customers. Examples of participation under this 
paradigm include the submission of complaints to operators, customer evaluation of service 
quality (Lobina, 2005b), and consumer contributions of labour and materials as a form of 
payment in-kind for services (Hall and Lobina, 2007). Under administrative rationalism the 
participant is the liberal subject and participation takes the prevalent form of citizen 
consultation, while final decisions rest with bureaucratic technocrats, and administrative 
redress as a bureaucratically sanctioned civil right (Pezon, 2007). Finally, the communitarian 
paradigm emphasises that the participant is the citizen and contemplates advanced forms of 
participation such as co-decision making, direct democracy, and community management.              
 
These paradigms can be categorised with the help of two meta-frameworks, or frameworks 
for the analysis of other frameworks, respectively aiming to capture their philosophical 
approach to resource redistribution and participation, and to interpreting complexity. Castro’s 
(forthcoming, 2014) meta-framework of exclusive and inclusive water service governance 
suggests that the neoliberal and communitarian paradigms are incompatible. More precisely, 
as different practices inspired to different paradigms can and do co-exist (Klein, 2013), it is 
impossible that the practice of policy and planning be contemporarily informed in equal 
terms by two opposite paradigms. The former’s reliance on the market as a redistributive 
instrument excludes those who cannot afford to pay the commercial price for accessing the 
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service. It thus conflicts with the latter’s aspiration to universal inclusion through collective 
ownership and communitarian ethos. By contrast, the administrative rationalism paradigm 
appears located at the interface between the two conceptual dimensions of exclusive and 
inclusive governance. On the one hand, the technocratic nature of decision making espoused 
by this paradigm excludes considerations alien to the professional rationality of bureaucrats. 
However, this has not prevented the commodification of those public enterprises where profit 
orientation and technocracy prevail. Also, the democratic accountability that comes with 
public ownership can temper bureaucratic intransigence. In fact, it is collective action that 
influenced public enterprises to achieve virtual universal service coverage in the countries of 
the global North, from the late XIX century to the 1960s (Castro, 2009).  
 
The neoliberal and communitarian paradigms respectively hold exclusive and inclusive 
conceptions of participatory water governance. The neoliberal paradigm’s favour for 
participation in the form of customer complaints excludes the genuine voice of users in a 
sector where customers are captive due to natural monopoly. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the communitarian paradigm affords maximum voice to citizens in view of the 
opportunities offered by having civil society represented in service providers’ executive 
bodies or by participatory budgeting. Again, administrative rationalism paradigm is subject to 
centrifugal tensions towards the other two paradigms. On the one hand, user consultation 
does not imply any obligation for technocrats to incorporate users’ views in their final 
decisions, and can therefore prove to be a practice no less exclusive than customer complaints 
or customer evaluation of service quality. On the other hand, administrative redress is in 
principle open to all citizens within the limits of due process, and thus represents a channel 
for citizens to make their voice heard.                         
 
The meta-theoretical frameworks of orthodox and heterodox economics are competing 
epistemological approaches to economic theory making. They allow us to consider how the 
neoliberal and communitarian paradigms of water governance relate to complexity. The 
neoliberal paradigm of water governance descends in fact from the orthodox or mainstream 
economics meta-theoretical framework, which represents the currently dominant meta-
theoretical paradigm in economics. Conversely, there are strong connections between the 
communitarian paradigm and the meta-theoretical framework of heterodox economics. 
Orthodox and heterodox economics have divergent approaches to dealing with social or 
institutional complexity: orthodox economics tends to reduce, while heterodox economics 
seeks to embrace complexity. In fact, orthodox economics assumes that causality is linear and 
that it happens in closed social systems, while heterodox economics adopts notions of 
circular, cumulative, and ultimately path dependent causation situated in open social systems 
(Dow, 2011; Lee, 2011; Lawson, 2006; Hodgson, 2000; Pluta, 2010). However influential, 
the orthodox assumption of linear causality is problematic because unrealistic. It consists in 
an under-socialised account of agency which does not question the occurrence of expected 
outcomes because in a closed system there is no change in the conditions of agents and 
underlying institutions (Sayer, 1992). In other words, if the initial hypothesis is that private 
sector is efficient orthodox theory will not contemplate that this assumption can be 
challenged because it does not recognise that the qualities of private operators and the 
qualities of the environment in which they act can be subject to change. By contrast, the 
heterodox hypothesis of path dependent causation implies a plurality of possible outcomes 
whose realisation is affected by uncertainty. While bringing little comfort to the deterministic 
mind, it avoids excluding explanations that are not envisaged at the outset of investigation. It 
is therefore a helpful antidote against tautology.     
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Connected by relationships of causal and logical dependence, the paradigms and meta-
frameworks of governance discussed here constitute an ecology of paradigms which 
embodies meta-governance. These are relationships of compatibility and incompatibility due 
to the fact that the emergence and dominance of paradigms are determined by multi-group 
assessments of the normative coherence of discourse (Lobina, 2012b). The neoliberal or 
mainstream paradigm is incompatible with the communitarian paradigm because market and 
community development cannot be reconciled. In fact, the privatist imperative of profit 
maximisation cannot tolerate other hegemonic principles. Instead, administrative rationalism 
appears compatible with both the neoliberal and communitarian paradigms as suggested by 
its predisposition to blend with either paradigm in relation to the organisation of water 
service provision and participatory water governance. In this ecology, advocacy coalitions 
mobilise paradigms by processes of association and dissociation in a complex syntax of 
paradigm advocacy. The wickedness of governance is thus linked to the ecology of 
paradigms by a dual relationship. By inducing pendulum swings, the necessity of wickedness 
determines continuous changes in the influence of compatible and incompatible paradigms of 
participatory water governance. In turn, the ecology of paradigms constitutes the milieu of 
the intractability of meta-governance problems of structuring and interpreting participation. 
In fact, in the absence of a plurality of paradigms the pendulum would stand still.      
 
5. Participatory governance as a tame problem 
The interaction between the necessity of wickedness and the ecology of governance 
paradigms defines the possibilities of structuring participatory water governance as a tame 
problem addressed by second-order governance. Through the mediation of first-order 
governance, dominant paradigms inform the definition of participation as a tame problem in 
governance sub-systems. The inherent complexity of the ecology of governance paradigms 
therefore translates in a plurality of feasible approaches to structuring and solving tame 
problems of participatory governance. Sintomer et al.’s (2012) taxonomy of participatory 
budgeting models makes for a sophisticated cross-country exploration of this plurality. For 
the sake of simplicity, I consider the effects of two competing governance paradigms – the 
neoliberal and the communitarian - on the way in which participatory water governance is 
defined and structured as a tame problem. This exercise requires looking at the institutions 
associated to paradigms and how rules, norms and customs enable and constrain decisions on 
who participates, how, for what purposes, and under which premises.        
 
Intrinsic to the neoliberal paradigm of water governance is the involvement of the private 
sector in the management of water and sanitation and, in alternative to private operation, the 
insistence that public operators mimic private companies’ ethos and practices. This 
commodification of water services affects the process and outcome of participation under the 
neoliberal paradigm. Miller (1999) observes that private sector participation and community 
involvement in water projects do not coexist. The profit maximisation imperative of the 
private sector is in fact a hegemonic principle and, as such, it cannot tolerate the centrality of 
non-commercial considerations which is a constitutive element of the communitarian 
paradigm. This prediction is supported by empirical evidence on the restrictive practices of 
participatory water governance under private sector participation in the global North and 
South. A recurrent feature of concessions and other private contracts is to limit public access 
to information on grounds of commercial confidentiality (Lobina, 2005a; Lanz and Eitner, 
2005; Beveridge et al., 2014). Another is to reduce the voice of participants and factual 
impact of their contributions by restricting participation to consultation (Lobina and Hall, 
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2007; de la Motte, 2005). Regulatory agencies established in conjunction with privatisation 
have curtailed the independence of participants in a number of cases. For example, the body 
representing water consumers in England and Wales was as an integral part of the structure of 
the regulator itself (de la Motte, 2005). Similarly, a consultative committee of users was 
incorporated in the structure of the regulatory agency for Bologna, Italy and the regulator 
limited the access of committee members to information and resources necessary for the 
fulfilment of their duties (Lobina and Matino, 2005). The neoliberal interpretation of tame 
problems of participatory water governance produces undesirable outcomes, including weak 
accountability and poor responsiveness to the interests of communities.   
 
The necessity of profit constrains the behaviour of policy participants under the neoliberal 
paradigm. This contrasts with the openness of institutional trajectories to arrive at the dual 
goal of the communitarian paradigm: human need satisfaction and community development. 
The openness of this process – which rejects profit as the preferred means to achieve 
collective goals – implies a plurality of paths for the pursuit of this dual goal, and a plurality 
of possible outcomes of participatory water governance. These outcomes can be more or less 
satisfactory in light of their responsiveness to social considerations. Tame problems of 
participatory governance are solved under the communitarian paradigm when the decision 
making process is aligned to the governance objectives identified by the served community. 
The following cases illustrate this point.  
 
In Grenoble, France, co-decision making was adopted with the return to public water supply 
operations in 2001. This consisted in the representation of civil society in the Board of 
Directors of the municipal service provider, and contributed to enhancing service quality and 
investment levels in infrastructure maintenance compared with the previous private and semi-
private operations (Lobina and Hall, 2007). In Porto Alegre, Brazil, co-decision making has 
not only been introduced at operational level similarly to the case of Grenoble. It has been 
adopted at regulatory level as civil society representatives sat in the body monitoring the 
operations and investments of the municipal enterprise. Also, co-decision making was 
adopted at policy making level as participatory budgeting was extended to the allocation of 
municipal financial resources for water investments. Participatory governance resulted in 
efficient, effective and sustainable water operations enjoying the community’s support for 
price increases aimed at preserving sustainability (Hall et al., 2002). In Venezuela, 
community participation in the management and monitoring of water operations has been 
institutionalised in public-community partnerships called Mesas Técnicas de Agua, whose 
remit includes the popularisation of knowledge on water. This has allowed Venezuela to 
achieve the MDG target on water as early as 2004, and the MDG target on sanitation in 2006 
(Lacabana and Cariola, 2013). However, there is no necessity in the positive outcome of 
participatory water governance under the communitarian paradigm. This is shown by the case 
of Cochabamba, Bolivia where the introduction of public participation has been associated 
with poor operational performance (Bakker, 2008). 
 
The observation of the dynamics of tameness reveals the role of strategic interest in 
determining the process and outcome of participatory water governance. This is exemplified 
by the private sector’s interest in profit maximisation, and regulatory agencies’ interest in 
preserving the system of privatisation, and their role in constraining the scope and 
effectiveness of participatory governance under the neoliberal paradigm. At the same time, 
the cognitive and the normative play an important role in shaping the paradigms that support 
the pursuit of interest in governance sub-systems. These findings corroborate the literature 
calling for the study of the interdependence of strategic interest and policy preference, in 
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order to advance the development of the advocacy coalition framework (Lobina, 2012b; 
Nohrstedt, 2010). They also chime with the literature invoking the analysis of the alignment 
of actors’ motivation and resources with institutions as a determinant of policy outcome 
(Lobina, 2013, 2012a; Surel, 2000). This has implications for the understanding of 
participatory water governance as a wicked and tame problem. It has been noted that the 
depoliticisation of participation has the effect of making invisible the power relationships that 
produce social injustice, thus facilitating their reproduction (Swyngedouw, 2005; White, 
1996; Leal, 2007; Cleaver, 2005). If the critical denunciation of injustice is a potent antidote 
against its invisibility, the comparative evaluation of the alignment of agency and institutions 
can be the method for predicting the policy outcome and ascertaining the social desirability 
of participatory water governance under competing political and economic paradigms.  
                      
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to contribute to conceptual clarity in the area of participatory 
water governance. Understanding how participatory water governance can at the same time 
be the solution to problems of sustainable water development, and a policy and planning 
problem to be defined and structured before being solved, requires careful consideration. 
While Rittel and Webber’s (1973) concept of wicked problems is a powerful analytical tool 
for making sense of policy and planning problems, the way in which this notion has been 
mobilised in the literature of the last forty years is problematic. The paradoxical nature of 
wicked problems lies in the unresolved tension between two incompatible definitions: that of 
wicked problems as intractable policy and planning problems that cannot be solved but only 
reinterpreted; and, that of wicked problems as a mere synonym for complex policy and 
planning problems. This tension points to the internal contradiction of wicked problems, as 
these cannot be at the same time unsolvable and solvable however complex. It also points to 
the inaccurate distinction between wicked and non-wicked or tame problems. Previous 
conceptualisations of tame problems have assumed that these were a synonym for problems 
that can be easily solved. But this leaves unanswered the question of how to define and 
structure the many policy and planning problems that can be solved even if their solution 
entails complexity.     
 
In order to resolve the internal contradiction of wicked problems, and to help distinguish 
between wicked and tame problems, this chapter has demonstrated the falsity of two equal 
and opposite paradoxes: the paradox of wickedness, which states that all policy and planning 
problems are unsolvable; and, the paradox of tameness, according to which all policy and 
planning problems can be solved. The two paradoxes are equal because both fail to 
distinguish between wicked and tame problems and, moving from opposite premises, they 
collapse wicked and tame problems into one another. It is the empirical observation of the 
practice of water governance that allows for ascertaining the falsity of the two paradoxes and 
calling for post-wickedness. This is an intellectual and practical predisposition that is 
consequential to making clarity on the distinction between wickedness and tameness, and 
leads to curiosity about the articulation of the two. The departure of post-wickedness from 
classical notions of wickedness lies in rejecting the idea that all policy and planning problems 
can be conflated into the same governance dimension. More precisely, post-wickedness 
derives from the realisation that wicked and tame problems originate from different orders of 
governance. 
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Wicked problems are unsolvable and their intractability is a necessary condition because they 
originate in meta-governance and their objective is to find definitive answers to 
transcendental questions on the organisation of society. Tame problems are solvable, 
however complex they might be, because they originate in second-order governance or the 
realm of policy implementation and aim to achieve specific and measurable goals informed 
by meta-governance and defined by first-order governance. Distinguishing between wicked 
and tame problems by locating them across the different orders of governance helps shed 
light on the fact that participatory water governance is a wicked problem when discussed in 
meta-governance. Here, the necessity of wickedness leads to the impossibility of solving this 
problem once and for all, but only to reinterpret that. At the same time, participatory water 
governance is a tame problem when discussed in second-order governance where multiple 
possible outcomes are possible depending on the influence exerted on the governance sub-
system by the dominant paradigm. Hence, post-wickedness contributes to shaping a research 
agenda concerned with the duality of the necessity of wickedness and the possibilities of 
tameness. This is a quintessentially critical realist agenda. As dominant paradigms influence 
mainstream policy, emerging paradigms inspire social resistance to orthodoxy, and the merits 
of dominant and emerging paradigms are revisited in light of the collective experience with 
the policies and processes they inform, the terrain delineated by post-wickedness is the 
terrain where the theory and practice of social and environmental justice is contested.            
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